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Abstract
Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far 
the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion 
policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EU’s provisions for democracy promotion and compares the 
implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes 
(Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend 
to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting 
power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the 
explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country 
variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important 
scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further 
investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EU’s differential ‘normative power’ in international 
relations.
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1.  Introduction1
In the course of the ‘climate change’ in international politics with the end of the Cold War, the European 
Union (EU) placed the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law prominently on its new 
foreign policy agenda. This democracy promotion mission legally enshrined in the treaty of Maastricht 
(1992/1993) has been central to the debate about the EU’s potential ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002, 
2006) in international relations.
Regardless of whether this mission is the expression of an ingrained self-conception or a strategic self-
portrayal, it has entailed institutional change within the EU. Since the early 1990s, the EU has developed 
a package of objectives, instruments and strategies for promoting democracy in its external relations. It 
clearly pursues a strategy of engagement of the target regimes, placing a strong emphasis on partnership 
based instruments such as political dialogue and technical and financial cooperation (democracy 
assistance). This is perfectly in line with accounts of the EU as a ‘civil power’ (Börzel/Risse 2007; Maull 
2005; Smith 2005). However, within the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries are least likely cases for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion, as 
they are both (semi-)authoritarian and lacking a membership perspective. Focusing therefore on the Euro-
Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able 
to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. It suggests that 
several factors mitigate the EU’s ‘normative power’, namely interdependence, political liberalisation, and 
statehood.
In a first step, the paper traces the evolution of the EU’s provisions for democracy promotion within the 
framework of its Mediterranean policy (section 2). Second, it analyses in how far this change has actually 
affected bilateral relations (section 3). It compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy 
assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and 
Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the 
claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. The considerable 
country variation, however, requires explanation. The paper therefore proceeds in elaborating and mapping 
three potential explanatory factors (section 4). Based on insights into EU ‘external governance’ and 
various approaches to cooperation in International Relations theories, the paper explores to what extent 
asymmetric interdependence with the EU as well as the degree of political liberalisation and statehood 
in target countries influence cooperation in the field of democracy promotion. A systematic comparison 
across countries and over time allows a first assessment of the conditions under which the EU can assert 
its supposed ‘normative power’ to bring about ‘climate change’ in international relations (section 5). The 
EU is most successful in bringing about cooperation in the field of democracy promotion in countries with 
a high degree of political liberalisation. While political liberalisation interacts with statehood, the role of 
interdependence is not conclusive. However, none of these factors explains the EU’s cooperation with 
Algeria and Tunisia in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of (domestic) factors that might account for the two outliers (section 6).
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2009 EUSA and DVPW conferences. The author would like 
to thank all participants and especially Federica Bicchi, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Tanja A. Börzel for their 
most helpful comments.
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2.  The EU’s Mediterranean Democracy Promotion Policy
Today’s relations of the EU with Mediterranean third countries build on several regional policy frameworks 
developed since the early 1990s. They encompass multi- and bilateral dimensions that cover political, 
economic, and cultural cooperation (Del Sarto/Schumacher 2005; Calleya 2005). Into these frameworks, 
the EU has over time integrated various instruments for democracy promotion that are in line with its 
global strategic framework (Bicchi 2006; Jünemann/Knodt 2006, 2007; Kelley 2006; Pace 2007). The idea 
of ‘co-ownership’ is apparent since the mid-1990s in the focus on partnership based instruments and a 
joint commitment to shared values. Nevertheless, the EU is the driving force behind democracy promotion 
in Euro-Mediterranean relations.
The EU has developed the idea of democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective since the mid-1980s. 
Including the Mediterranean countries in a broad notion of development policy going beyond the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific countries, it committed itself to promoting democracy in the Mediterranean in 
1990 (European Commission 1991: 3). In 1991, the EU outlined its general framework for promoting 
liberal, representative democracy as well as the rule of law and respect for human rights.2 The Council 
clearly stated that “a positive and constructive approach should receive priority”, focusing on such 
instruments as political dialogue (persuasion), financial assistance (capacity-building) and positive 
conditionality (incentives), and only secondarily drawing on negative conditionality tied to contractual 
relations (Council of the EU 1991). In line with this general policy, the European Commission implemented 
some first exploratory democracy assistance projects in the Mediterranean in the early 1990s (European 
Commission 1994, 1996a).
In 1995, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law gained a more prominent place in the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy with the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the introduction 
of a political dimension into the traditional economic cooperation. Launched as a joint initiative with 
12 Mediterranean Partners (MP), the Barcelona Declaration contained a commitment of all partners to 
respect and further these issues.3 The EMP continued the EU’s regionally inclusive approach aiming at an 
equal or at least consistent treatment of as many Mediterranean neighbours as possible. It replaced the 
old set of agreements and financial protocols for development cooperation under earlier regional policy 
frameworks with a new generation of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) 
and a regional external cooperation programme (MEDA). Again in line with its global policy framework, 
the EU institutionalised several instruments for democracy promotion within its Mediterranean policy 
framework. The so-called “essential element clause” was introduced to the EMAA and it created the basis 
for negative political conditionality and political dialogue in bilateral relations (European Commission 
1995a). The multilateral meetings and conferences known as the Barcelona Process provided another 
forum for political dialogue. The early efforts at providing democracy assistance were formalised in a 
2 In 1991, several EU institutions worked on a first set of guidelines for the EU’s democracy promotion policy, see 
Council of the EU 1991, European Commission 1991, and European Council 1991; these cornerstones were still 
valid when the Commission consolidated the EU’s strategy in 2001, see European Commission 2001a.
3 The Barcelona Declaration was adopted at the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 27 and 28 November 
1995 in Barcelona by the EU, its then 15 member states, and originally 12 MP that were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey; for the text of the 
declaration see http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm (10 August 2006).
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regional MEDA Democracy Programme (Karkutli/Bützler 1999), which merged into the global European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 1999. MEDA placed financial assistance under a 
similar caveat as cooperation under the EMAA. Mainstreaming the objective of democracy promotion 
into MEDA created a second channel for providing democracy assistance. While the EIDHR is committed 
to a ‘grassroots’ approach to democracy assistance, funding small scale projects focussing on civil society 
actors, MEDA added are a more state-centred perspective.
The EU’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean (2000) and Strategic Partnership (2004) reinforced 
its commitment to promote democracy in the region.4 At the same time, the EU started to develop a 
strategic vision for democracy promotion specifically in the Mediterranean (European Commission 2003a). 
Existing instruments for democracy promotion were reformed and new ones introduced, especially with 
the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003/2004.5 The European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) replaced MEDA as external cooperation programme in 2007 and 
bilaterally agreed Action Plans (AP) have complemented contractual relations since 2005. Continuing the 
instruments of political dialogue and democracy assistance under the new framework, the ENP created 
an explicit positive political conditionality, which is based on the negotiation, implementation, and regular 
monitoring of the bilateral AP. In addition, the so-called Democracy or Governance Facility draws on MEDA 
and ENPI funds respectively to provide monetary incentives for political reforms (European Commission 
2006: 12).
The latest addition to the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations, “The Barcelona Process: Union 
for the Mediterranean” (UMed), does not directly touch upon bilateral relations.6 Regarding the role of 
democracy and human rights in cooperation, it builds on the ‘Barcelona acquis’ and stresses common 
commitments and objectives, but does not place democracy promotion high on its agenda of multilateral 
projects.
4 However, neither the Common Strategy nor the Strategic Partnership touched upon the institutionalised forms 
of cooperation; see the Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean 
region, 2000/458/CFSP, Official Journal L 183, 22.07.2000, p. 5-10 and Presidency Conclusions on a Strategic 
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Brussels European Council, 17 and 18 June 2004.
5 Apart from relations with Mediterranean neighbours, the ENP also encompasses an Eastern dimension. It lea-
ves out Turkey as an accession candidate country, see European Commission 2003b and European Commission 
2004
6 The UMed was officially launched in July 2008: Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, 
Paris, 13 July 2008, http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/0713_declaration_de_paris/Joint_
declaration_of_the_Paris_summit_for_the_Mediterranean-EN.pdf (8 September 2008). Institutional changes 
to the EMP’s multilateral dimension were specified in November 2008, but did not affect any provisions for de-
mocracy promotion, see Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean ministerial conference, Marseille, 3-4 
November 2008, Final declaration, published by the Council of the EU on 4 November 2008, 15187/08 (Presse 
314). The UMed goes beyond the original MP, including Libya, Mauretania, and the Western Balkan countries.
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Figure 1: EU democracy promotion instruments in the Mediterranean
Overall, the EU has been quite successful in shaping the regional agenda on democracy promotion, 
introducing democracy, human rights, and the rule of law prominently into the Euro-Mediterranean 
framework for cooperation. Considering the EU’s rhetoric (European Commission 2001a, 2003a) and the 
general trends in its application of instruments (Youngs 2002; van Hüllen/Stahn 2009), the EU pursues 
a predominantly ‘positive’ approach to democracy promotion relying on persuasion, socialisation, and 
capacity building instead of coercion or negative incentives. This supports the wide spread classification of 
the EU as a ‘civil power’ in international relations. There is a strong focus on partnership based instruments 
(political dialogue, democracy assistance) that rely on the partner’s consent or active cooperation for 
implementing measures. By contrast, sanctions as unilateral measures on the basis of formalised negative 
political conditionality have never been adopted vis-à-vis Mediterranean Partners. Instead, the EU 
seems to rely on ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004, 2005), given the recent 
introduction of positive conditionality as a means to incite political reform.
However, the implementation of ‘soft’ democracy promotion instruments, such as political dialogue and 
democracy assistance, fundamentally depends on the domestic partner’s cooperation. Especially in the 
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Mediterranean, it is not evident why authoritarian regimes should respond positively to international 
democracy promotion efforts, given the unique combination of authoritarianism and ‘strong’ statehood, 
which differs from most other world regions (Schlumberger 2008). So, in how far has the EU actually 
shaped bilateral relations with its Mediterranean neighbours, i.e. succeeded in actively engaging 
Arab authoritarian countries in its democracy promotion efforts? The next section investigates the 
implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as partnership based instruments in seven 
Mediterranean Partners since the early 1990s.
3.  Cooperation on Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean
A systematic analysis of the implementation of the two partnership based instruments Political Dialogue 
and Democracy Assistance with seven Mediterranean countries between 1990 and 2008 reveals two major 
empirical findings: On the one hand, there is a clear regional trend (over time) that is very much in line 
with the evolution of the EU’s democracy promotion framework. On the other hand, there is significant 
country variation both in the timing and the overall level of cooperation. This section will first briefly sketch 
the overall trend of cooperation on democracy promotion before turning to a more nuanced comparison 
between countries.71
There is a clear regional trend for both the conduct of political dialogue and the implementation of 
democracy assistance over time. While there used to be occasional meetings (negotiation sessions, Troika 
visits, Cooperation Councils), “political dialogue” really did become institutionalised with the entry into 
force of the respective EMAA. The Association Councils provided a much more regular forum for dialogue 
than, for example, the previous Cooperation Councils. In line with the Commission’s Communication 
on “human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners” (European Commission 2003a), all 
Association Council meetings have included a specific agenda item for “political dialogue” since 2003. 
However, political dialogue was mostly referred to an informal part of the meeting and thus even more 
withdrawn from public scrutiny than is generally the case for these meetings. At the same time, the 
creation of technical subcommittees first included a ‘mainstreaming’ of matters relating to human rights 
and democracy and then, between 2004 and 2007, the creation of specific human rights subcommittees.
7 This section is based on an extensive analysis of EU documents and websites. This includes the European 
Commission’s annual reports on external assistance, programming documents (Country Strategy Papers and 
National Indicative Programmes) for MEDA and ENPI, as well as various resources available on the European 
Commission’s websites for external relations (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/index_en.htm), neigh-
bourhood policy (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm), the Europe-Aid Co-operation Office (http://
ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm), and the Treaties Office Database (http://ec.europa.eu/world/agree-
ments/default.home.do), last accessed 4 October 2009. 
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Figure 2: Political Dialogue under the EMAA: Association Council (ACon) and Human Rights Subcommittee 
(SubCom) meetings82
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia
1990-
1997
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1998 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a ACon
1999 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a --
2000 n/a n/a n/a n/a ACon n/a ACon
2001 n/a n/a n/a n/a ACon n/a --
2002 n/a n/a ACon n/a -- n/a ACon
2003 n/a n/a ACon n/a ACon n/a
ACon
2004 n/a ACon ACon n/a Acon n/a --
2005 -- --
ACon
SubCom
n/a Acon n/a ACon
2006 ACon ACon ACon ACon n/a --
2007 ACon ACon
ACon
SubCom
ACon
SubCom
ACon
SubCom
n/a
ACon
SubCom
2008 ACon
ACon
SubCom
ACon
SubCom
ACon
ACon
SubCom
n/a
ACon
SubCom
By 2008, political dialogue was institutionalised with all countries except for Syria, where the EMAA had 
not yet entered into force. For the other six countries, it has been included as an agenda item in all 
Association Council meetings since 2003. Among these countries, Algeria is the only one that has not yet 
agreed to the additional creation of a specific human rights subcommittee.
With regard to democracy assistance, funding has steadily increased and projects have become more 
diversified. After only few experimental projects in the first half of the 1990s, the regional MEDA Democracy 
Programme (MDP) under the horizontal budget heading of the “European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights” (EIDHR) generalised democracy assistance across the region. Under the global EIDHR, 
annual appropriations nearly doubled and the introduction of the micro-project scheme – at first only to 
so called ‘focus countries’, since 2004 to all Mediterranean Partners – increased the number of projects 
implemented with local non-state actors.
8 Association Council decisions officially mainstreamed the treatment of matters relating to human rights and 
democracy in other bodies under the EMAA and/or institutionalised specific Human Rights Subcommittees. 
Sources: for Association Council meetings see documentation of Association Councils (minutes, agendas, EU 
statements), for human rights subcommittee meetings see Presidency of the European Union et al. 2008: 24, 
154, Council of the EU and European Commission 2007: 20, EU HR Report 2005: 31, EU Statement EU-Jordan 
ACon 2005: 3, 2006: 12.
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Table 1: Democracy Assistance under EIDHR (in mio €)93
Early EIDHR
(1991-1994)
MDP
(1996-1998)
EIDHR
(2000-2006)
Total
Algeria 0 1,37 7,13 8,5
Egypt 0 0,91 6,72 7,63
Jordan 0,69 1,11 2,05 3,85
Lebanon 0,03 1,11 4,93 6,07
Morocco 0,05 2,29 3,51 5,85
Syria 0 0,23 1,01 1,24
Tunisia 0,23 0,23 4,17 4,63
Total 1,00 7,25 29,52 37,77
Average/year 0,25 2,42 4,22
While cooperation under the EIDHR has continually taken place since the mid 1990s, democracy 
assistance was only mainstreamed into the regional cooperation programme MEDA around 2000. There 
had been virtually no related projects under MEDA I (1995-1999), but with MEDA II (2000-2006), there 
has been a steady increase in funding for related projects, especially with the 2002 and 2005 National 
Indicative Programmes. In most countries, projects relating to the judiciary and penal system, civil society, 
and governance were implemented. Still, projects varied significantly in size, with smaller-scale projects 
addressing issues more directly related to civil society, human rights and participation, and large-scale 
projects targeting state actors in public administration and the judiciary. Under ENPI (since 2007), funds 
for democracy assistance have again nearly doubled, but this only signifies a slight increase of its share of 
total aid.
Table 2: Democracy Assistance under MEDA/ENPI (in mio €)104
MEDA I
(1995-1999)
MEDA II
(2000-2006)
ENPI
(2007-2010)
Total
Algeria 5,00 48,20 17,00 70,20
Egypt 0,00 25,00 40,00 65,00
Jordan 0,00 7,00 17,00 24,00
Lebanon 0,00 10,00 22,00 32,00
Morocco 4,00 32,70 28,00 64,70
Syria 0,00 2,00 30,00 32,00
Tunisia 0,00 33,65 0,00 33,65
Total 9,00 158,55 154,00 321,55
Average per year 1,80 22,65 38,50
Total aid 2475,00 3072,80 2314,00 7861,80
Average aid per year 495,00 438,97 578,50
DA share of aid 0,36% 5,16% 6,66% 4,09%
9 Own compilation based on the European Commission’s early EIDHR Reports (European Commission 1992; 
European Commission 1994; European Commission 1995b; European Commission 1996a; European Commis-
sion 1996b),Karkutli and Bützler (1999), as well as different compendia and project lists for projects since 2000 
(European Commission 2000, 2001b, 2001c, 2008a, 2008b).
10 Own compilation based on the 2002, 2005, and 2007 National Indicative Programmes for the seven countries; 
figures for total aid based on European Commission (2001d: 12, 2007).
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This general trend to increasing cooperation in the field of democracy promotion confirms that the EU’s 
agenda setting power has had a real impact on bilateral relations with its Mediterranean neighbours. At 
the same time, we find significant variation across countries, regarding the timing of the first application 
of instruments and the intensity or ‘quality’ of cooperation in terms of funding levels, the openness of 
political dialogue and the smoothness of implementation of democracy assistance projects with state and 
non-state actors.
Thus, while the process of institutionalising political dialogue followed a similar pattern in most countries, 
there was tremendous variation in its timing. This depended on the entry into force of the respective 
EMAA, ranging from 1998 to 2006 and the Syrian EMAA still pending. Once the EMAA entered into force, 
however, variation with regard to formal aspects, such as the frequency and transparency of meetings as 
well as the set-up of human rights subcommittees, decreases. The two most noticeable exceptions are 
Syria, still lacking the formal structure, and Algeria, which is the only country that had not established 
a human rights subcommittee by 2008. Still, the set-up took longer for some countries than for others. 
The delays varied between one year for Jordan and Lebanon and three years for Tunisia. Another source 
of country variation is the content or ‘quality’ of the dialogue conducted, judged by the minutes of 
Association Council meetings and statements made on other occasions. It becomes apparent that beyond 
the formal conduct of political dialogue, the tone and issues raised varied, both within countries over 
time, with a trend towards more open dialogue, but more importantly across countries. Thus, the political 
dialogue with Morocco and Jordan appears to be more open than with Tunisia. Finally, for some countries, 
there were incidences when partners interrupted the ‘normal’ conduct of political dialogue, for example 
through the postponement of meetings, revealing political dissonances. This concerned political dialogue 
with Tunisia between 2005 and 2007 and the first subcommittee meeting with Egypt.
The timing and extent of cooperation in implementing democracy assistance varied enormously between 
countries, too. Formal eligibility for funding under the different EU instruments generally did not differ for 
Mediterranean Partners, except for the short-lived experiment of a limited number of ‘focus countries’ in 
2002-2004 that included Algeria and Tunisia. While the EIDHR has been continuously used after the initial 
stage of ‘experimental’ projects, the levels of funding both under the MDP and the global EIDHR differed 
significantly between countries. The total amount of funding for the whole period varied between more 
than eight million Euro for Algeria and just above one million Euro for Syria. In addition, the process of 
‘mainstreaming’ democracy assistance into the regional cooperation programme took several years. First 
projects with Maghreb countries had already been committed at the end of the 1990s, still under MEDA I, 
whereas the other countries followed as late as 2005. Similarly to the EIDHR, the levels of funding – both 
total and as a share of overall aid – varied between countries. Tunisia is the only country that did not 
follow the general trend of increasing democracy assistance: While in 2005 and 2007, even Syria agreed to 
allocating funds to related projects, the EU and Tunisia have not committed new projects since 2005, due 
to severe implementation problems of earlier projects.115
11 For the European Commission’s explanation see the 2007 ENPI Country Strategy Paper for Tunisia 2007, p. 13.
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Figures 3 and 4: Democracy Assistance committed in National Indicative Programmes126 
Considering the implementation of partnership based instruments in each country, its development 
over time and in comparison with other countries, allows a tentative assessment of the overall level of 
cooperation with each Mediterranean Partner. To do so, the significant variation for each country over 
time needs to be related to the regional trend and to the performance of other countries. Taken together, 
cooperation with Jordan and Morocco is most advanced, followed by Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Algeria 
ahead of Syria.
Jordan and Morocco have the best record when looking at the conduct of political dialogue and the 
implementation of democracy assistance. Their Association Councils have met regularly since the 
comparably early entry into force of their EMAA and they were the first countries to set up special human 
rights and democracy subcommittees after a Commission’s initiative in 2003. The subcommittees have 
met regularly ever since. Meetings of the Association Council are well documented and from the EU’s 
statements on Association Council meetings and the EU’s human rights reports, it becomes clear that 
both countries are actively engaged in a comparably open dialogue on political issues. Jordan is the only 
country that has topics such as human rights and political reform explicitly on the agenda of meetings 
since 2003 and even established a second political subcommittee on regional cooperation. Morocco is 
one of the front-runners in implementing EU democracy assistance, both under MEDA since around 2000 
and the EIDHR since the early 1990s, receiving high total amounts of funding. Jordan has also pioneered 
under the EIDHR and joined the process of mainstreaming democracy assistance into MEDA relatively 
early, in 2002. While overall funding levels are much lower than for Morocco, Jordan still receives a high 
per capita funding.
12 Own compilation based on the 2002, 2005, and 2007 National Indicative Programmes for the seven countries. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, Syria clearly has to be considered the regional laggard. As the EMAA has 
still not entered into force, there are no formalised structures for political dialogue (Association Council, 
subcommittee). While there have been ongoing contacts, e.g. in the framework of negotiations for the 
EMAA between 1998 and 2004, the EU repeatedly complained about the Syrian reluctance to address 
issues relating to human rights and democracy (Presidency of the European Union et al. 2008: 71; Council 
of the EU and European Commission 2007: 71; Council of the EU 2006: 200). In addition, Syria has always 
received very little funding under the EIDHR and democracy assistance was only integrated into MEDA 
funds in 2005. Nevertheless, the EU and Syria have committed substantial funds for democracy assistance 
under the ENPI and while it remains to be seen how the actual implementation of projects will evolve, 
this development is in line with the general regional trend towards increased cooperation on democracy 
promotion.
The situation is less clear for Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Lebanon and Egypt started much 
later to engage more actively in EU democracy promotion efforts. The level of engagement seems to be 
increasing in line with the general trend of intensification of democracy promotion efforts. The EMAA 
have only recently entered into force, providing the institutional setting for formalised political dialogue, 
but since then, meetings of the Association Council have taken place regularly and a human rights and 
democracy subcommittee has been set up without major delays, together with technical subcommittees 
in other areas of cooperation. Only with Egypt, there have been some occasions where the scheduling of 
meetings has proven difficult due to political tensions.137Lebanon had already during the 1990s engaged in 
EU democracy assistance under the EIDHR, but first projects were introduced into MEDA/ENPI only lately. 
While receiving medium funds in total, Lebanon generally has a high per capita funding and democracy 
assistance makes up for a relatively large share of overall aid. By contrast, Egypt received very little 
democracy assistance under the EIDHR during the 1990s, but funding increased and democracy assistance 
was mainstreamed into MEDA already in 2003. Egypt has high levels of total funding, but due to its large 
population, does less well in terms of per capita funding.
In contrast to these two countries, Tunisia and Algeria are more at odds with the overall trends of 
increasing engagement in democracy promotion. While Tunisia seemed to be one of the pioneers in the 
1990s and performs well in some aspects of formal engagement, implementation of measures has often 
been obstructed. Especially since the EU stepped up its efforts around 2003, cooperation in matters of 
human rights and democracy proves to be more and more difficult. Tunisia used to be a front-runner, with 
the early entry into force of the EMAA allowing political dialogue already since the late 1990s and first 
experiments in democracy assistance in the early 1990s. However, meetings of the Association Council take 
place less often than with other countries and especially at some point after 2003, cooperation became 
difficult due to political tensions. Thus, there were nearly three years between two meetings in 2005 and 
2007. EU officials have in interviews referred to this gap as the result of a political crisis, caused by the 
13 The second Association Council meeting took place two years after the first and the EU’s statement is not 
made public, two indicators hinting at political tensions, after the EU had very openly addressed democratic 
shortcomings on the occasion of the first Association Council meeting. In addition, the first meeting of the 
human rights subcommittee was postponed for several months, as  “following the adoption on 17 January of 
a European Parliament resolution on human rights in Egypt, the Egyptian government called-off the political 
subcommittee initially scheduled to take place on 23-24 January”, see European Commission’s Delegation to 
Egypt, What’s New? http://www.delegy.ec.europa.eu/en/News/551.asp, last accessed 4 October 2009.
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EU’s dissatisfaction with the Tunisian political situation and cooperation on human rights and democracy 
related issues.148This is also reflected in the major delay in the set-up of a human rights and democracy 
subcommittee in 2007, more than four years after other technical subcommittees had been created. In 
the area of democracy assistance, Tunisia used to be a pioneer in the region, too, both with regard to 
first projects under the EIDHR in the early 1990s and the mainstreaming of democracy assistance into 
the MEDA scheme around 2000. However, while at a first glance, funding levels for democracy assistance 
seem to be important for Tunisia, hardly any projects have been implemented. Either little democracy 
assistance has been programmed in the first place, as under the MEDA Democracy Programme in the mid 
1990s, or the implementation of projects was limited or failed completely, which was the case for both 
MEDA and EIDHR projects between 2000 and 2005. As a consequence, there have been no more projects 
programmed after 2005 and the Commission has even openly withdrawn from its attempt to provide 
democracy assistance under ENPI.159 
The picture is very different for Algeria. On the one hand, the EU is confronted with open refusal of 
cooperation, for example regarding the set-up of a specific subcommittee. On the other hand, Algeria 
engages quite actively in some democracy promotion activities. While Association Council meetings 
have taken place very regularly since the entry into force of the EMAA, no human rights and democracy 
subcommittee has been created along with other technical subcommittees in 2007. The EU and Algeria, 
however, had started an informal dialogue in the late 1990s that was supposed to address inter alia the 
internal political situation. While there was little democracy assistance during the 1990s, engagement in 
democracy assistance has increased up since around 2000. Algeria then pioneered in the mainstreaming 
of democracy assistance into MEDA as well as under the EIDHR as a ‘focus country’ (2002-2004) and 
beyond.1610High funding levels and the continuation of programmes over different financing periods show 
that despite its rejection of an overly formalised human rights dialogue, Algeria does actively engage in 
the EU’s democracy promotion efforts.
Taken together, the EU has clearly been able to exert some ‘normative power’ in its relations with 
Mediterranean Partners, transforming its regional democracy promotion agenda into actual cooperation. 
However, the significant variation in the extent and timing of the implementation of political dialogue and 
democracy assistance across countries requires explanation, suggesting that the EU’s ‘power’ is very much 
mitigated by scope conditions. 
4. Scope Conditions for Cooperation
The implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance as instruments of democracy 
promotion, based on ideas of partnership and cooperation, depends on the willingness and capacity of the 
14  In a more subtle way, both partners spoke in 2007 of a ‘relaunch’ of the political dialogue, hinting at its dis-
ruption due to political tensions, see the Draft Minutes of the sixth EU-Tunisian Association Council meeting in 
2007, p.4f.
15 See the European Commission’s 2007 ENPI Country Strategy Paper for Tunisia 2007, p. 13.
16 See the European Commission’s 2001 Programming Document fort he EIDHR 2002-2004, p. 5, and the EU’s 
Human Rights Reports for 2003 and 2005.
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target regime to actively engage in external democracy promotion efforts. In order to identify conditions 
under which they can have an impact, it is useful to conceive of democracy promotion efforts as a process 
of interaction and cooperation between the international actor actively pursuing its agenda in external 
relations, on the one hand, and the targeted regime, on the other. The role of the latter can vary from 
opponent to partner, either boycotting, ignoring, or actively engaging in the external actor’s efforts. 
Cooperation is then the outcome of a process of joint decision-making, as the two sides agree – or do 
not agree – on joint action, in this case the implementation of partnership based instruments (Zartmann 
1977). The process of interaction can be thought of as continuous negotiations in which the partners argue 
and bargain over an initial offer or demand for cooperation (for the notion of post-agreement bargaining, 
see Jönsson and Tallberg 1998). This conceptualisation allows drawing on different International Relations 
(IR) theories that address the topic of cooperation in international relations from different angles. To 
identify conditions under which cooperation occurs, regime theory (Krasner 1983; Hasenclever et al. 2000), 
international negotiations (for an overview, see Jönsson 2002; Iklé 1964), action theories (Risse 2000; 
Müller 2004), and compliance with international norms (Chayes/Chayes 1993; Checkel 1997; Underdal 
1998) offer useful insights. 
For reasons of simplicity, this paper adopts a rationalist framework for interaction. Actors are assumed to 
make decisions about cooperation consciously and base their choices on fixed preferences and rational 
(material and immaterial) cost-benefit calculations. This does not preclude the notion of norm-guided 
behaviour: cooperation takes place within bilateral relations which are guided by “principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 
1983a: 1). It would go beyond the scope of this paper to go into the details of game theory. Suffice to 
say that it is useful to think of this interaction as a “mixed motive game”, where partners have both 
diverging and common interests (see Iklé 1964). The EU and the Arab authoritarian MP have different sets 
of preferences in their bilateral relations, touching upon the issue areas of security, welfare, and (political) 
authority. The implementation of democracy promotion instruments is assumed to have implications 
for the attainment of their preferences, shaping their choice of strategy regarding (no) cooperation 
accordingly. While interests of the EU and Arab authoritarian regimes in regime change clearly diverge, 
they might still find common ground for negotiations when considering joint interests, such as welfare 
or regional stability. The cost-benefit calculation for (no) cooperation can be expected to be influenced 
by three factors which figure prominently in the literature, 1) the partners’ (economic) interdependence, 
the degree of 2) political liberalisation, and 3) statehood in the target country (see Börzel et al. 2008; 
Jünemann/Knodt 2007; Youngs 2001). These factors can be linked back to theoretical arguments in the IR 
literature.
Classic IR approaches support the argument that asymmetric interdependence directly affects the 
“bargaining power” (Jönsson/Tallberg 1998: 381; Habeeb 1988) of international actors, making them 
more or less vulnerable to actions taken by other international actors (Keohane/Nye 2001). Mutual 
interdependence can be shaped by the respective power resources of partners, in terms of the sheer 
size of their territory, population, economy, and military (for an overview see Baldwin 2002). However, 
there are also aspects of bilateral relations that more directly affect important economic and/or security 
issues for either partner and create interdependence, such as trade, energy resources, regional conflicts, 
migration, or aid. If the EU is highly dependent on a Mediterranean Partner (MP), for example in terms 
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of energy resources or geostrategy, it might be more reluctant to push the MP to implement partnership 
based instruments for democracy promotion against its will. Conversely, if a MP is highly dependent on 
the EU, e.g. in terms of trade and aid, it might more readily cooperate in the field of democracy promotion. 
Therefore, cooperation is more likely if asymmetric interdependence favours the EU, as it increases the 
MP’s and decreases the EU’s vulnerability to welfare losses (hypothesis 1).
The degree of political liberalisation of a target regime indicates its openness to allow for pluralistic 
and competitive politics. This determines the (mis)fit of the external request for democratisation with 
domestic norms and institutions (Börzel/Risse 2003; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; 
Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 2008). It facilitates or constrains the engagement of an authoritarian regime in 
international democracy promotion, as cooperation might challenge the regime’s domestic power base 
to a varying degree.1711From the EU’s perspective, a higher degree of liberalisation increases the chances 
for a gradual regime transformation through reforms that does not risk regional stability because of 
a more abrupt regime change and a power vacuum during the transitional period (Reiber 2009). In a 
similar vein, concerns about the domestic power for the MP and regional stability for the EU are directly 
affected by the degree of statehood of the target country. Threats to international sovereignty, but also 
domestic challenges to the monopoly on the legitimate use of force limit statehood and can destabilise a 
regime (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2007). Therefore, cooperation is more likely if the MP has a high level of political 
liberalisation and statehood, because this decreases the MP’s risk of domestic power losses and the EU’s 
risk of instability its neighbourhood (hypothesis 2). If the two variables diverge, the degree of political 
liberalisation is more important than the degree of statehood. The former indicates the authoritarian 
regime’s willingness to engage in cooperation in the first place, whereas the latter only affects the EU’s 
readiness to push for cooperation if necessary. Thus, in the case of a high degree of political liberalisation 
and a low degree of statehood, cooperation is still more likely than in the case of a low degree of political 
liberalisation and a high degree of statehood (hypothesis 2a).
Figure 5: Cost-benefit calculations on international democracy promotion
Cooperation No cooperation
EU MP EU MP
Costs
regional stability ↓
welfare ↓
domestic power ↓
no change in 
democracy
welfare ↓
international 
legitimacy ↓
Benefits democracy ↑
welfare ↑
international 
legitimacy ↑
no change in regional 
stability
no change in welfare
no change in 
domestic power
The remainder of this section presents the findings of an empirical mapping for these three factors for the 
seven countries under scrutiny since the early 1990s.
17 This interest-based approach is closely linked to an identity-based approach emphasising changing perception 
of appropriateness (March/Olsen 1998), while a structuralist approach could argue that an institutional fit per 
se facilitates cooperation.
18 | KFG Working Paper No. 9 | November 2009 
Interdependence
Following a ‘power as resources’ approach, the EU with its member states have more (economic) power 
than any of the Mediterranean countries. However, even in terms of the sheer size of the countries and 
their economies, variation between the countries in the region is enormous. Algeria and Egypt are by far 
the biggest countries among the seven, considering attributes such as territory and population, but also 
their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the volume of their external trade (imports and exports of goods 
and services). Morocco takes a middle position and among the small countries, Syria and Tunisia are still 
significantly larger than Jordan and Lebanon. Despite these differences, the countries’ roles in the world 
economy are limited, looking at their share in global GDP and trade volumes (see also Paczynska 2008: 
239). While the level of military expenditure varies both with regard to its share of the countries’ GDP and 
in total terms, overall “the region is the most highly militarized in the world” (Gerner/Schrodt 2008: 100).
Table 3: Size1812
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia
Surface area in million sq. km 2.38 1.00 0.09 0.01 0.45 0.19 0.16
Population in million
1990 25 55 3 3 24 13 8
2007 34 75 6 4 31 20 10
GDP in billion current 
US$
1990 62 43 4 3 26 12 12
2007 116 107 14 22 66 33 31
GDP in % of world 
total
1990 0.28 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.05
2007 0.25 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.06
Trade volume in 
billion current US$
1990 30 23 6 3 15 7 12
2006 95 85 25 18 61 31 39
Trade volume in % of 
world total
1990 0.36 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.14
2006 0.30 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.11
Military spending in % 
of GDP
1990 1.46 4.7 8.02 7.55 4.14 6.04 2.02
2007 2.92 2.5 6.94 5.84 3.29 3.94 1.39
Military spending 
total in billion current 
US$
1990 0.90 2.02 0.32 0.23 1.08 0.72 0.24
2007 3.94 3.20 1.11 1.40 2.40 1.50 0.49
The form of economic interdependence between two actors can be more directly established when looking 
at their role for one another in the fields of trade and aid. The EU and its member states are by far the 
most important trading partners for the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, potentially 
creating some leverage for the EU (Eurostat 2001, 2007). However, in contrast to its neighbours, oil and 
gas make up more than 95 per cent of Algerian exports (see Paczynska 2008: 245). This makes Algeria one 
of the largest sources of energy imports for the EU, shifting the interdependence with the EU in favour 
of Algeria. The only country in the region with a trade balance surplus, Algeria becomes more dependent 
on global oil price fluctuations than the EU as a trading partner. The Middle Eastern countries have more 
diversified trading patterns. For Egypt and Jordan, the United States and countries from the region are 
more important as trading partners than the EU (Paczynska 2008: 237f). For Lebanon and Syria, the EU 
18  Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online database). The world GDP for 1990 was 21,883 and 
for 2007 54,583 billion current US$; the trade volume is calculated as imports + exports of goods and services; 
the world trade volume for 1990 was 8369 and for 2006 27,809 billion current US$. 
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only comes after other Middle Eastern countries as trade partner. Exporting some oil, Syria is the only 
other country to have a fairly even trade balance. 
According to the International Monetary Fund, all seven countries have emerging economies, but their 
level of economic and human development varies. Except for Lebanon, which is classified as an “upper 
middle income” country by the World Bank since 1997, all other countries remain in the category of 
“lower middle income”. However, the distribution of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is uneven in 
the region, with Egypt and Syria at the lower and Algeria at the upper end of the category. Similarly, all 
seven countries show “medium human development” according the Human Development Reports of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), but Lebanon is ranked 78 whereas Morocco is ranked 
as low as 127. The countries therefore face different challenges when it comes to economic and social 
development, which might make them more or less dependent on external assistance. In terms of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and official aid they receive, again figures vary enormously in absolute 
terms and more importantly in view of their respective GDP and populations. In general, the region has 
seen a major decline of ODA during the 1990s. This trend has been reversed around 2001 for all countries 
except for Syria and, on a high level, for Egypt. Egypt used to be the by far largest recipient of (US) external 
assistance since the Camp David Accord with Israel in 1978. In relation to their size, the smaller countries, 
such as Lebanon and Jordan, receive much higher levels of ODA per capita and as a share of their GDP. 
They are followed by Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, whereas Algeria only receives negligible amounts of aid. 
For Syria, the Soviet Union used to be the most important donor until its break-up (see Paczynska 2008: 
228). This source of external assistance has not been replaced since the early 1990s, leaving Syria with 
marginal ODA levels.
Table 4: Development and aid1913
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria
GNI per capita, Atlas 
method (current US$)
1990 2420 770 1390 1230 1030 890 1430
2006 3030 1360 2650 5580 2160 1560 2970
World Bank Analytical Classification
L = Low Income
LM = Lower Middle Income
UM = Upper Middle Income
LM
LM
L 1990-
1994
LM
LM until 
1996
UM 
since 
1997
LM LM LM
HDI
1990 0.645 0.572 .. .. 0.516 0.625 0.625
2006 0.748 0.716 0.769 0.796 0.646 0.736 0.762
HDI rank 2006
All Medium Human Development
100 116 90 78 127 105 95
Official Development 
Assistance and official aid 
(million current US$)
1990 132 5426 886 252 1048 683 391
2006 209 873 580 707 1046 27 432
ave-
rage
260 2173 583 252 693 243 267
ODA in % of GDP
1990 0,21 12,58 22,04 8,88 4,06 5,55 3,18
2006 0,18 0,81 4,11 3,11 1,60 0,08 1,43
ODA per capita (in current 
US$)
1990 5,21 98,41 279,49 84,75 43,36 53,68 47,95
2006 6,25 11,77 104,66 174,41 34,29 1,38 42,65
13 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online database); UNDP, Human Development Reports 
(online statistics).
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When looking at the share of external assistance that comes from the EU and its member states, Europe is 
the most important source of funding for Tunisia and Morocco. This is also true for Algeria and Syria, but 
the importance of Europe as a donor is attenuated by the fact that both countries receive only low levels 
of aid. Egypt and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Lebanon, have been traditional recipients of US aid, even 
though the role of Europe has been growing for Egypt and Lebanon.
Table 5: Aid dependence on Europe2014
Algeria Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia
All donors, in million US$ 
(current prices)
1990 132 5426 886 252 1048 683 391
2007 389 1096 516 956 1072 82 323
DAC EU Members, in million 
US$ (current prices)
1990 100 664 212 49 395 63 153
2007 276 314 42 284 547 49 184
DAC EU Members in % of all 
donors
1990 76 12 24 20 38 9 39
2007 71 29 8 30 51 60 57
The seven Arab authoritarian countries are definitely the ‘junior partners’ in bilateral relations with the EU. 
However, the asymmetry of interdependence varies, making them more or less dependent on the EU. In 
general, there is a clear distinction between the Middle Eastern and the Maghreb countries as regards the 
EU’s role in international trade and aid, but factors such as a country’s ‘size’ or the availability of natural 
resources further differentiates the picture. Thus Morocco and Tunisia are highly dependent on the EU 
whereas oil and natural gas exports make Algeria one of the least dependent countries. Similarly, Egypt 
and Syria enjoy relative independence. Egypt heavily relies on the US as an alternative source of aid and 
support and Syria is geared towards other regional actors. Jordan and Lebanon as the smallest countries 
of the Middle East take a medium position in terms of dependence on the EU in international relations.
Political liberalisation
The region is known for a conspicuous resistance to the ‘third wave’ (Huntington) of democratisation. 
While there have been reforms, none of the countries in the region is in a process of transition. Even 
though we see regime transformation, no regime changes have occurred since independence and the 
wave of national revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. The region is considered exemplary in discussing 
the ‘end of the transition paradigm’ (Carothers 2002). At the same time, these countries illustrate the 
difficulties of classifying regimes in the ‘grey zone’ between democratic and authoritarian regimes. The 
seven countries of interest all have representative democratic institutions and hold (more or less) regular 
elections. However, they lack significant attributes of liberal democracy and do not even qualify as 
‘electoral democracies’ according to Freedom House standards.2115
14 Source: OECD.StatExtracts, ODA by Recipient by country, http://stats.oecd.org, 12 September 2009.
21 Freedom House 2009: Electoral democracies, FIW 1989-90-2009, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/
fiw09/CompHistData/ElectoralDemocracyTable.xls, last accessed 3 September 2009.
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While the Freedom House indices for political rights and civil liberties do not provide a thorough picture 
of the ‘quality’ of democracy in a country, they are a good starting point for systematically comparing the 
degree of political liberalisation across countries. The overall picture is one of widespread and persisting 
authoritarianism, but there are differences in degree between the countries. Jordan and Morocco, the 
two remaining constitutional monarchies, are the only ones consistently ranked as “partly free” since 
1990. Their combined ratings are 4,3 and 4,8 in average for 1990-2008. Lebanon was ranked as “partly 
free” in 2008, but generally ranked as “not free” since the mid 1990s, just as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, 
with averages around 5,5 in the last 19 years. Finally, Syria has scored worst possible during the whole 
period, with an average of seven. This picture is largely confirmed by one of the World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators (WGI), namely “Voice and Accountability.”2216All seven countries are in the lower 
third in a world-wide comparison, but there are still important variations between countries. As none of 
them shows significant and lasting changes over time, their average values for 1996-2008 allow a similar 
grouping as the Freedom in the World index, with Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco in the lead, followed by 
Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, and with Syria at the bottom.
Considering the Polity IV “polity” index, the picture slightly changes, as indicators for “institutionalized 
democracy” and “institutionalized autocracy” put much more emphasis on procedural aspects. Thus, 
while Lebanon only achieves mediocre scores on the other indices, it has emerged as the only noteworthy 
democratic polity once Syria had withdrawn its troops in 2005.2317Also, the variation for Algeria over time 
is more pronounced, with the latest change in 2004 bringing it into the realm of democracy. By contrast, 
Moroccans might enjoy relatively high freedoms, but the regime itself is qualified as only slightly less 
autocratic than the Syrian, albeit improving over time. 
Most regimes experienced a period of opening/political liberalisation in the 1980s or early 1990s, that did, 
however, not survive for long in most countries. With the cancellation of the 1992 elections, Algeria is the 
most prominent example of a failed transition, but other attempts at opening up the political arena were 
also followed by periods of stagnation and renewed repression, as in Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia. Similarly, 
the opening in Morocco, begun under Hassan II, has not led to a clear democratic breakthrough. Here it 
is interesting to note that the high hopes for political reform linked to the generational change in Jordan, 
Morocco (both 1999), and Syria (2000) have not transformed into significant and lasting improvements. 
22 While the team around Daniel Kaufman draws on the Freedom House “Freedom in the World” ratings for the 
composite indicator of “Voice and Accountability”, “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties” are only two sources of 
over 30, see Kaufmann et al. (2009: 74).
23 Due to the continued foreign intervention in domestic politics, the polity index for Lebanon had been coded as 
“interrupted” for 1990-2004, the first 15 years after the end of the civil war (1975-1989), which was itself coded 
as a period of “interregnum”. For the use of ‘standardized authority scores’ see Marshall and Jaggers 2008: 17f.
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Graph 1: World Bank‘s WGI „Voice and Accountability“
Taken together, albeit none of the regimes under scrutiny qualifies as a liberal democracy, the degree 
of political liberalisation varies significantly across countries. Lebanon and the two monarchies, Jordan 
and Morocco, are the most liberalised regimes. In comparison, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia take a middle 
position well ahead of Syria which is the least liberalised autocracy among the seven.
Statehood
Although all seven countries are recognised as internationally sovereign states, statehood can be 
threatened both externally and internally, challenging the regime and forcing it to defend its power base 
(see Krasner 2009). Apart from international war, external intervention or occupation can threaten a state’s 
“Westphalian” sovereignty. Domestically, the monopoly on the legitimate use of force can be contested in 
violent conflict. Civil war or terrorist attacks can severely limit statehood and create instability for the 
regime. Some indicators that capture these different aspects are, at a general level, the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicator “Political Stability & Absence of Violence”, and for specific incidences of violence 
and (internal and external) conflicts the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute on International 
Conflict Research, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) with data on state failure, and the list of High 
Casualty Terrorist Bombings (HCTB) of the Center for Systemic Peace.
Overall, Tunisia emerges as the least contested country in the region – according to the World Governance 
Indicators, its political stability values are above the regional average, it is not involved in international 
conflicts, and internally, there have been no violent conflicts since the early 1990s. The two monarchies 
of Morocco and Jordan also present a picture of stability, with good WGI scores and little internal violence, 
even though Morocco has not yet settled the conflict over the Western Sahara, neither internally nor 
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with Algeria, and Jordan is situated in a war-prone neighbourhood and has a latent conflict with Israel 
over water resources and of course the West Bank. Syria has also been quite stable, but has experienced 
growing international and internal tensions since 2004. Israel still occupies the Syrian Golan heights. While 
all these countries have suffered from terrorist attacks after 2001, they are not confronted with movements 
regularly resorting to violence. By contrast, Egypt still scores similarly on the WGI, but has been challenged 
by the Muslim Brotherhood and militant Islamist groups since 1992. While state repression has ended 
the “revolutionary war” (PTIF) in 1999, the conflict still overshadows the regime’s dealing with Islamist 
opposition. In 2004-2006, there were three HCTB that hurt international tourism to Egypt.
Lebanon and Algeria are at the same time at the lower end of the WGI scores and the only two countries 
with significant variation over time (see Kaufmann et al. 2009: 33). Algeria started into the 1990s with a civil 
war between Islamist militant groups and the government, after a short period of political liberalisation 
that was abruptly ended by the military cancelling elections in 1992. Although the civil war was officially 
ended in 2000 and the political stability score has much improved since then, the PTIF considered the 
“revolutionary war” as ended only in 2004 and the Conflict Barometer shows that the conflict with Islamist 
groups, but also with the Berber movement in Kabylia, is persistent. Lebanon, by contrast, had just 
overcome 15 years of civil war in 1990 so that the 1990s were mainly a period of (economic) recovery. 
During this period of relative stability, external interventions significantly limited Lebanese statehood. The 
second country in the region to conclude a peace agreement with Israel in 1994, Israeli troops nevertheless 
occupied parts of Southern Lebanon until 2000. In addition, Syrian troops remained in Lebanon after the 
end of the civil war, securing on the one hand the fragile peace, on the other illustrating the Syrian claim 
to dominate Lebanese politics. Syria only removed its troops after the “Cedar Revolution” on the occasion 
of former Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination in 2005. At the same time, however, political instability has 
increased significantly in Lebanon, marked inter alia by terrorist attacks, the war between Hizbollah and 
Israel in 2006 and an internal conflict with the Palestinian refugees in 2007 and 2008.
Graph 2: World Bank‘s WGI „Political Stability & Absence of Violence“
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In sum, Tunisia has the highest degree of statehood, followed by Jordan and Morocco. Egypt and Syria are 
still strong, but more contested. Finally, civil war and violent conflict have severely limited statehood in 
Algeria and Lebanon.
5.  Analysis
Even though it is impossible to aggregate overall values of cooperation, interdependence, political 
liberalisation, and statehood for each country over the course of nearly 20 years, this section tries to sum 
up empirical findings to allow a more systematic comparison.
The previous sections have shown that cooperation in the field of democracy promotion has evolved in line 
with the EU’s provisions introduced to its Mediterranean policy framework. However, the implementation 
of political dialogue and democracy assistance as partnership based instruments varies across countries, 
both regarding intensity and timing. Morocco and Jordan are in the lead, whereas Syria clearly is the 
regional laggard. In the middle field, the cases of Tunisia and Algeria are especially noteworthy. While the 
former is the only country openly going against the trend of intensifying cooperation over time, the latter 
seems much more selective in its engagement than the other countries.
Regarding interdependence, there is a clear difference in the role of the EU for the Maghreb and the Middle 
Eastern countries. For Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, the EU and its member states are trading partner and 
donor number one, whereas trading patterns in the Middle East are much more diversified and the US 
plays a greater role in trade and aid. Nevertheless, while Morocco and Tunisia appear highly dependent 
on the EU, Algeria can balance the relationship with its important oil and gas exports. Similarly, in the 
Middle East, the small countries of Jordan and Lebanon are still more dependent on the EU than is Egypt, 
after Israel the largest recipient of US aid in the region, which exceeds by far European assistance to other 
countries. Syria is very much focused on relations with regional actors, but Western actors cannot ignore 
its strategic importance in the Middle East conflict. Indicators for political liberalisation and statehood 
are a bit more straightforward. Jordan, Morocco, and Lebanon qualify as the more liberalised regimes 
in the region, whereas Syria is a closed autocracy. For Algeria and Lebanon, civil war and violent conflict 
interrupted the democratic process and severely limited their statehood. By contrast, the two monarchies, 
Jordan and Morocco, and especially Tunisia emerge as the less contested states.
Figure 6: Overview of cooperation and potential explanatory factors
Cooperation Dependence Liberalisation Statehood
Algeria 0 - 0 -
Egypt 0 - 0 0
Jordan + 0 + +
Lebanon               0 0 + -
Morocco + + + +
Syria - - - 0
Tunisia 0 + 0 +
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Overall, the picture for Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria seems to confirm the expectation that 
interdependence favouring the EU as well as high levels of political liberalisation and statehood in the 
target regime are linked to better cooperation in implementing political dialogue and democracy assistance 
(hypotheses 1 and 2). However, this is not the case for Algeria, Lebanon, and Tunisia. More generally, the 
degree of political liberalisation seems to be related most closely to cooperation, whereas the relation 
with statehood and interdependence is inconclusive. In Lebanon, the high degree of political liberalisation 
does not go hand in hand with intensive cooperation in the field of democracy promotion. Considering 
the combination of political liberalisation statehood, the Lebanese case actually supports the expected 
interaction between the two variables: The severely limited statehood mitigates the effect of an open 
regime (hypothesis 2a).
Finally, the cooperation of the EU with Algeria and Tunisia occurs under very different circumstances. 
Considering the Tunisian dependence on the EU and its strong statehood, it should be a candidate for 
active engagement in the EU’s democracy promotion agenda. However, after a promising start in the late 
1990s, cooperation has deteriorated to the point that the European Commission has openly given up on 
implementing democracy assistance with Tunisian authorities. In contrast, Algeria should be a least likely 
candidate for cooperation on democracy promotion, given its limited dependence on the EU, but this is 
only partially reflected in the Algerian refusal to take political dialogue further on aspects of democracy 
and human rights. After the turmoil of civil war in the 1990s, democracy assistance has actually made up 
a relatively high share of overall EU aid compared with other countries in the region. In addition, political 
dialogue had early on been conducted on an informal basis.
6. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in the Mediterranean to scrutinise its 
claimed ‘normative power’ in international relations. Committed to the quest of promoting democracy 
vis-à-vis Mediterranean Partners since the early 1990s, the EU introduced conceptual and institutional 
change to the framework for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Its approach truly qualifies as that of a 
‘civil power.’ A clear trend to more cooperation in the implementation of political dialogue and democracy 
assistance testifies to the EU’s capacity to shape bilateral relations with its Mediterranean Partners. 
However, significant country variation hints at the importance of scope conditions for the EU’s differential 
‘normative power.’ A systematic comparison of cooperation and three potential explanatory factors 
suggests that the degree of political liberalisation is more relevant than interdependence and statehood 
for the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance. While interdependence does not 
show any clear relation with the degree of cooperation in the field of democracy promotion, statehood 
seems to mitigate the role of political liberalisation. However, the analysis cannot account for the two 
outliers of Algeria and Tunisia. Even though they are respectively least and most likely cases, this is not 
reflected in the observed outcomes of cooperation. Tunisia is more dependent and has stronger statehood 
and should therefore cooperate much better than Algeria. This is not the case, as cooperation with Tunisia 
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has been degrading over time, whereas Algeria has engaged in selective but active cooperation since the 
late 1990s.
Based on these empirical findings, it seems promising to refine the theoretical framework and the 
operationalisation of the explanatory factors in order to take research on international democracy 
promotion and cooperation between external actors and target countries a step further. In light of the two 
outliers, a closer look into processes of domestic politics in the target countries might be necessary. This 
might nuance the picture drawn for the variables of political liberalisation and statehood and their effect 
on cost-benefit-calculations regarding the risks of domestic power losses and instability. For example, the 
configuration of the domestic political situation, existing change agents and reform dynamics, but also 
the regime’s handling of internal demands for reform might impact on a regime’s willingness to engage in 
political cooperation with external actors. For the Mediterranean in particular, there is a growing literature 
on strategies of in- and exclusion of oppositional, especially Islamic, actors in domestic politics (Brown et 
al. 2006; Lust-Okar/Zerhouni 2008). In addition, the content of external democracy promotion efforts 
needs to be considered in more detail. Comparing it with the domestic political agenda, overlapping 
interests and objectives might reduce the ‘misfit’ and significantly lower the costs for the authoritarian 
regime to engage in cooperation (Börzel/Risse 2003; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005). For 
instance, EU democracy assistance to Algeria has had an unusually strong focus on the security sector, 
which might support Algerian efforts at consolidating statehood. Finally, on the EU’s side, unilateral 
measures of democracy promotion, such as naming and shaming by diplomatic means and the application 
of political conditionality, might indicate differences in the EU’s readiness to push an authoritarian regime 
for cooperation (Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 2008). 
Considering the political implications of these findings, the link between the degree of political 
liberalisation and the readiness of a regime to actively engage in external democracy promotion efforts 
creates a dilemma: Cooperation is most difficult where it is most needed. At the same time, practitioners 
of democracy promotion are faced by an increasingly critical discussion of ‘coercive’ or highly ‘intrusive’ 
instruments and strategies (Dalacoura 2003) in light of insights that successful democratisation is a 
foremost domestically driven process (Whitehead 2002; Geddes 1999). However, the EU’s experience in 
the Mediterranean is also encouraging, as it proves that institutions do matter: In the long run, even the 
most ‘stubborn’ authoritarian regimes have started to engage in the EU’s democracy promotion agenda. 
The EU has often been chided for its ‘one size fits all’ approach (Börzel/Risse 2004), but in this case it might 
be an essential part of its ‘normative power.’ 
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